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15689 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
6d003e1acd test/steal_emoji: consolidate configuration setup 2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
d1ce5fd911 test/steal_emoji: reduce code duplication with mock macro 2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
a4fa2ec9af StealEmoji: make final paths infeasible to predict
Certain attacks rely on predictable paths for their payloads.
If we weren’t so overly lax in our (id, URL) check, the current
counterfeit activity exploit would be one of those.
It seems plausible for future attacks to hinge on
or being made easier by predictable paths too.

In general, letting remote actors place arbitrary data at
a path within our domain of their choosing (sans prefix)
just doesn’t seem like a good idea.

Using fully random filenames would have worked as well, but this
is less friendly for admins checking emoji dirs.
The generated suffix should still be more than enough;
an attacker needs on average 140 trillion attempts to
correctly guess the final path.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
ee5ce87825 test: use pack functions to check for emoji
The hardocded path and filenames assumptions
will be broken with the next commit.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
d1c4d07404 Convert StealEmoji to pack.json
This will decouple filenames from shortcodes and
allow more image formats to work instead of only
those included in the auto-load glob. (Albeit we
still saved other formats to disk, wasting space)

Furthermore, this will allow us to make
final URL paths infeasible to predict.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
fa98b44acf Fill out path for newly created packs
Before this was only filled on loading the pack again,
preventing the created pack from being used directly.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
5b126567bb StealEmoji: drop superfluous basename
Since 3 commits ago we restrict shortcodes to a subset of
the POSIX Portable Filename Character Set, therefore
this can never have a directory component.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
a8c6c780b4 StealEmoji: use Content-Type and reject non-images
E.g. *key’s emoji URLs typically don’t have file extensions, but
until now we just slapped ".png" at its end hoping for the best.

Furthermore, this gives us a chance to actually reject non-images,
which before was not feasible exatly due to those extension-less URLs
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
111cdb0d86 Split steal_emoji function for better readability 2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
af041db6dc Limit emoji stealer to alphanum, dash, or underscore characters
As suggested in b387f4a1c1, only steal
emoji with alphanumerc, dash, or underscore characters.

Also consolidate all validation logic into a single function.

===

Taken from akkoma#703 with cosmetic tweaks

This matches our existing validation logic from Pleroma.Emoji,
and apart from excluding the dot also POSIX’s Portable Filename
Character Set making it always safe for use in filenames.

Mastodon is even stricter also disallowing U+002D HYPEN-MINUS
and requiring at least two characters.

Given both we and Mastodon reject shortcodes excluded
by this anyway, this doesn’t seem like a loss.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
fb54c47f0b Update example nginx config
To account for our subdomain recommendations
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
fc36b04016 Drop media proxy same-domain default for base_url
Even more than with user uploads, a same-domain proxy setup bears
significant security risks due to serving untrusted content under
the main domain space.

A risky setup like that should never be the default.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
11ae8344eb Sanitise Content-Type of media proxy URLs
Just as with uploads and emoji before, this can otherwise be used
to place counterfeit AP objects or other malicious payloads.
In this case, even if we never assign a priviliged type to content,
the remote server can and until now we just mimcked whatever it told us.

Preview URLs already handle only specific, safe content types
and redirect to the external host for all else; thus no additional
sanitisiation is needed for them.

Non-previews are all delegated to the modified ReverseProxy module.
It already has consolidated logic for building response headers
making it easy to slip in sanitisation.

Although proxy urls are prefixed by a MAC built from a server secret,
attackers can still achieve a perfect id match when they are able to
change the contents of the pointed to URL. After sending an posts
containing an attachment at a controlled destination, the proxy URL can
be read back and inserted into the payload. After injection of
counterfeits in the target server the content can again be changed
to something innocuous lessening chance of detection.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
bcc528b2e2 Never automatically assign privileged content types
By mapping all extensions related to our custom privileged types
back to innocuous text/plain, our custom types will never automatically
be inserted which was one of the factors making impersonation possible.

Note, this does not invalidate the upload and emoji Content-Type
restrictions from previous commits. Apart from counterfeit AP objects
there are other payloads with standard types this protects against,
e.g. *.js Javascript payloads as used in prior frontend injections.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
e88d0a2853 Fix Content-Type of our schema
Strict servers fail to process anything from us otherwise.

Fixes: akkoma#716
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
ba558c0c24 Limit instance emoji to image types
Else malicious emoji packs or our EmojiStealer MRF can
put payloads into the same domain as the instance itself.
Sanitising the content type should prevent proper clients
from acting on any potential payload.

Note, this does not affect the default emoji shipped with Akkoma
as they are handled by another plug. However, those are fully trusted
and thus not in needed of sanitisation.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
0ec62acb9d Always insert Dedupe upload filter
This actually was already intended before to eradict all future
path-traversal-style exploits and to fix issues with some
characters like akkoma#610 in 0b2ec0ccee. However, Dedupe and
AnonymizeFilename got mixed up. The latter only anonymises the name
in Content-Disposition headers GET parameters (with link_name),
_not_ the upload path.

Even without Dedupe, the upload path is prefixed by an UUID,
so it _should_ already be hard to guess for attackers. But now
we actually can be sure no path shenanigangs occur, uploads
reliably work and save some disk space.

While this makes the final path predictable, this prediction is
not exploitable. Insertion of a back-reference to the upload
itself requires pulling off a successfull preimage attack against
SHA-256, which is deemed infeasible for the foreseeable futures.

Dedupe was already included in the default list in config.exs
since 28cfb2c37a, but this will get overridde by whatever the
config generated by the "pleroma.instance gen" task chose.

Upload+delete tests running in parallel using Dedupe might be flaky, but
this was already true before and needs its own commit to fix eventually.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
fef773ca35 Drop media base_url default and recommend different domain
Same-domain setups enabled now at least two exploits,
so they ought to be discouraged and definitely not be the default.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
bdefbb8fd9 plug/upload_media: query config only once on init 2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
f7c9793542 Sanitise Content-Type of uploads
The lack thereof enables spoofing ActivityPub objects.

A malicious user could upload fake activities as attachments
and (if having access to remote search) trick local and remote
fedi instances into fetching and processing it as a valid object.

If uploads are hosted on the same domain as the instance itself,
it is possible for anyone with upload access to impersonate(!)
other users of the same instance.
If uploads are exclusively hosted on a different domain, even the most
basic check of domain of the object id and fetch url matching should
prevent impersonation. However, it may still be possible to trick
servers into accepting bogus users on the upload (sub)domain and bogus
notes attributed to such users.
Instances which later migrated to a different domain and have a
permissive redirect rule in place can still be vulnerable.
If — like Akkoma — the fetching server is overly permissive with
redirects, impersonation still works.

This was possible because Plug.Static also uses our custom
MIME type mappings used for actually authentic AP objects.

Provided external storage providers don’t somehow return ActivityStream
Content-Types on their own, instances using those are also safe against
their users being spoofed via uploads.

Akkoma instances using the OnlyMedia upload filter
cannot be exploited as a vector in this way — IF the
fetching server validates the Content-Type of
fetched objects (Akkoma itself does this already).

However, restricting uploads to only multimedia files may be a bit too
heavy-handed. Instead this commit will restrict the returned
Content-Type headers for user uploaded files to a safe subset, falling
back to generic 'application/octet-stream' for anything else.
This will also protect against non-AP payloads as e.g. used in
past frontend code injection attacks.

It’s a slight regression in user comfort, if say PDFs are uploaded,
but this trade-off seems fairly acceptable.

(Note, just excluding our own custom types would offer no protection
 against non-AP payloads and bear a (perhaps small) risk of a silent
 regression should MIME ever decide to add a canonical extension for
 ActivityPub objects)

Now, one might expect there to be other defence mechanisms
besides Content-Type preventing counterfeits from being accepted,
like e.g. validation of the queried URL and AP ID matching.
Inserting a self-reference into our uploads is hard, but unfortunately
*oma does not verify the id in such a way and happily accepts _anything_
from the same domain (without even considering redirects).
E.g. Sharkey (and possibly other *keys) seem to attempt to guard
against this by immediately refetching the object from its ID, but
this is easily circumvented by just uploading two payloads with the
ID of one linking to the other.

Unfortunately *oma is thus _both_ a vector for spoofing and
vulnerable to those spoof payloads, resulting in an easy way
to impersonate our users.

Similar flaws exists for emoji and media proxy.

Subsequent commits will fix this by rigorously sanitising
content types in more areas, hardening our checks, improving
the default config and discouraging insecure config options.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
6116f81546
Don't strip newlines in the Atom feed
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2024-03-11 12:50:14 +01:00
7ef93c0b6d Add set_content_type to Plug.StaticNoCT 2024-03-04 17:50:20 +01:00
dbb6091d01 Import copy of Plug.Static from Plug 1.15.3
The following commit will apply the needed patch
2024-03-04 17:50:20 +01:00
5d467af6c5 Update notes on security exploit handling 2024-03-04 17:50:19 +01:00
Helge
5d89e0c917 Allow for url to be a list
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This solves interoperability issues, see:
- https://git.pleroma.social/pleroma/pleroma/-/issues/3253
- https://socialhub.activitypub.rocks/t/fep-fffd-proxy-objects/3172/30?u=helge
- https://data.funfedi.dev/0.1.1/#url-parameter
2024-03-03 09:11:45 +01:00
f18e2ba42c Refresh Users much more aggressively when processing Move activities
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The default refresh interval of 1 day is woefully inadequate here;
users expect to be able to add the alias to their new account and
press the move button on their old account and have it work.

This allows callers to specify a maximum age before a refetch is
triggered. We set that to 5s for the move code, as a nice compromise
between Making Things Work and ensuring that this can't be used
to hammer a remote server
2024-02-29 21:14:53 +01:00
fc95519dbf Allow fetching over IPv6
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Mint/Finch disable IPv6 by default preventing us from
fetching anything from IPv6-only hosts without this.
2024-02-25 23:50:51 +01:00
889b57df82 2024.02 release
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2024-02-24 13:54:21 +00:00
Weblate
34ffb92db4 Update translation files
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Updated by "Squash Git commits" hook in Weblate.

Co-authored-by: Weblate <noreply@weblate.org>
Translate-URL: http://translate.akkoma.dev/projects/akkoma/akkoma-backend-posix-errors/
Translation: Pleroma fe/Akkoma Backend (Posix Errors)
2024-02-24 13:42:59 +00:00
Weblate
c6dceb1802 Translated using Weblate (Polish)
Currently translated at 100.0% (47 of 47 strings)

Co-authored-by: Weblate <noreply@weblate.org>
Co-authored-by: subtype <subtype@hollow.capital>
Translate-URL: http://translate.akkoma.dev/projects/akkoma/akkoma-backend-posix-errors/pl/
Translation: Pleroma fe/Akkoma Backend (Posix Errors)
2024-02-24 13:42:59 +00:00
Weblate
caaf2deb22 Translated using Weblate (Polish)
Currently translated at 18.1% (183 of 1006 strings)

Translated using Weblate (Polish)

Currently translated at 6.6% (67 of 1006 strings)

Co-authored-by: Weblate <noreply@weblate.org>
Co-authored-by: subtype <subtype@hollow.capital>
Translate-URL: http://translate.akkoma.dev/projects/akkoma/akkoma-backend-config-descriptions/pl/
Translation: Pleroma fe/Akkoma Backend (Config Descriptions)
2024-02-24 13:42:59 +00:00
7d61fb0906 Merge pull request 'Fix static-fe Twitter metadata / URL previews' (#700) from Oneric/akkoma:staticfe-metadata into develop
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Reviewed-on: #700
2024-02-24 13:42:55 +00:00
cdf73e0ac8 Merge pull request 'Better document database differences for Pleroma migrations' (#699) from Oneric/akkoma:doc_pleroma-migration-db into develop
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Reviewed-on: #699
2024-02-24 04:33:43 +00:00
967e6b8ade Merge pull request 'Docs: Add description for mrf_reject_newly_created_account_notes' (#695) from YokaiRick/akkoma:doc_mrf_reject_acc_notes into develop
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Reviewed-on: #695
2024-02-24 04:31:28 +00:00
d7c8e9df27 static-fe: don’t squeeze non-square avatars
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This will crop them to a square matching behaviour of Husky and *key
and allowing us to never worry about consistent alignment.
Note, akkoma-fe instead displays the full image with inserted spacing.
2024-02-23 23:39:44 +00:00
a0daec6ea1 static-fe: don’t squeeze non-square emoji
Emoji and the navbar items want to let blend in with lines of text,
so fix their height and let the width adjust as needed.
2024-02-23 23:39:44 +00:00
bff2812a93 More prominently document db migrations in migrations from Pleroma
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By now most instance will run a version past 2022-08 but the guide
only documented it for from source installs and Pleroma develop.
2024-02-23 23:54:14 +01:00
7964272c98 Document how to avoid data loss on migration from Pleroma 2024-02-23 23:54:09 +01:00
c08f49d88e Add tests for static-fe metadata tags
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2024-02-21 00:33:32 +00:00
3111181d3c mix format
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2024-02-20 15:09:04 +00:00
2f9aad0e65 Merge pull request '[Security] StealEmojiPolicy: Sanitize shortcodes' (#701) from erincandescent/akkoma:stealemojipolicy-sanitize into develop
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Reviewed-on: #701
2024-02-20 15:08:54 +00:00
b387f4a1c1 Don't steal emoji who's shortcodes have dots or colons in their name
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Mastodon at the very least seems to prevent the creation of emoji with
dots in their name (and refuses to accept them in federation). It feels
like being cautious in what we accept is reasonable here.

Colons are the emoji separator and so obviously should be blocked.

Perhaps instead of filtering out things like this we should just
do a regex match on `[a-zA-Z0-9_-]`? But that's plausibly a decision
for another day

    Perhaps we should also have a centralised "is this a valid emoji shortcode?"
    function
2024-02-20 11:33:55 +01:00
Haelwenn (lanodan) Monnier
7d94476dd6 StealEmojiPolicy: Sanitize shortcodes
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Closes: https://git.pleroma.social/pleroma/pleroma/-/issues/3245
2024-02-20 11:19:00 +01:00
c25cfe9b7a fixed spelling
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2024-02-19 23:25:20 +01:00
41dd37d796 doc/cheatsheet: add missing MRFs
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Or mentions of MRFs in the main list
whose options were already documented.
2024-02-19 23:15:47 +01:00
9830d54fa1 doc/cheatsheet: sort main MRF list alphabetically
It is too cumbersome to find a specific policy atm
or to check if all are docuemtned yet.
Trivial placeholder policies are excluded from this.
2024-02-19 23:15:30 +01:00
f254e4f530 doc/cheatsheet: add missing MRF config detail docs
And remove “on by default” text from individual entries.
They are now laready in the “on by default” section.
2024-02-19 23:14:44 +01:00
da4190c46e doc/cheatsheet: split out always active MRFs
It doesn’t make sense to add/remove them from the policies list
2024-02-19 23:14:24 +01:00
7a2d68c3ab doc/cheatsheet: add link to ActivityExpiration config details 2024-02-19 23:14:07 +01:00
8e7a89605d doc/cheatsheet: move MRF policies key to end of section
This makes it easier to spot the transparency options
2024-02-19 23:13:48 +01:00