Commit graph

9224 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
0648d9ebaa Add mix tasks to detect spoofed posts and users
At least as far as we can
2024-03-26 16:05:20 -01:00
d441101200 Add mix task to detect uploaded spoof payloads 2024-03-26 16:05:20 -01:00
61ec592d66 Drop obsolete pixelfed workaround
This pixelfed issue was fixed in 2022-12 in
https://github.com/pixelfed/pixelfed/pull/3932

Co-authored-by: FloatingGhost <hannah@coffee-and-dreams.uk>
2024-03-26 15:11:06 -01:00
8684964c5d Only allow exact id matches
This protects us from falling for obvious spoofs as from the current
upload exploit (unfortunately we can’t reasonably do anything about
spoofs with exact matches as was possible via emoji and proxy).

Such objects being invalid is supported by the spec, sepcifically
sections 3.1 and 3.2: https://www.w3.org/TR/activitypub/#obj-id

Anonymous objects are not relevant here (they can only exists within
parent objects iiuc) and neither is client-to-server or transient objects
(as those cannot be fetched in the first place).
This leaves us with the requirement for `id` to (a) exist and
(b) be a publicly dereferencable URI from the originating server.
This alone does not yet demand strict equivalence, but the spec then
further explains objects ought to be fetchable _via their ID_.
Meaning an object not retrievable via its ID, is invalid.

This reading is supported by the fact, e.g. GoToSocial (recently) and
Mastodon (for 6+ years) do already implement such strict ID checks,
additionally proving this doesn’t cause federation issues in practice.

However, apart from canonical IDs there can also be additional display
URLs. *omas first redirect those to their canonical location, but *keys
and Mastodon directly serve the AP representation without redirects.

Mastodon and GTS deal with this in two different ways,
but both constitute an effective countermeasure:
 - Mastodon:
   Unless it already is a known AP id, two fetches occur.
   The first fetch just reads the `id` property and then refetches from
   the id. The last fetch requires the returned id to exactly match the
   URL the content was fetched from. (This can be optimised by skipping
   the second fetch if it already matches)
   05eda8d193/app/helpers/jsonld_helper.rb (L168)
   63f0979799

 - GTS:
   Only does a single fetch and then checks if _either_ the id
   _or_ url property (which can be an object) match the original fetch
   URL. This relies on implementations always including their display URL
   as "url" if differing from the id. For actors this is true for all
   investigated implementations, for posts only Mastodon includes an
   "url", but it is also the only one with a differing display URL.
   2bafd7daf5 (diff-943bbb02c8ac74ac5dc5d20807e561dcdfaebdc3b62b10730f643a20ac23c24fR222)

Albeit Mastodon’s refetch offers higher compatibility with theoretical
implmentations using either multiple different display URL or not
denoting any of them as "url" at all, for now we chose to adopt a
GTS-like refetch-free approach to avoid additional implementation
concerns wrt to whether redirects should be allowed when fetching a
canonical AP id and potential for accidentally loosening some checks
(e.g. cross-domain refetches) for one of the fetches.
This may be reconsidered in the future.
2024-03-25 14:05:05 -01:00
48b3a35793 Update user reference after fetch
Since we always followed redirects (and until recently allowed fuzzy id
matches), the ap_id of the received object might differ from the iniital
fetch url. This lead to us mistakenly trying to insert a new user with
the same nickname, ap_id, etc as an existing user (which will fail due
to uniqueness constraints) instead of updating the existing one.
2024-03-25 14:05:05 -01:00
9061d148be Ensure object id doesn’t change on refetch 2024-03-25 14:05:05 -01:00
3e134b07fa fetcher: return final URL after redirects from get_object
Since we reject cross-domain redirects, this doesn’t yet
make a difference, but it’s requried for stricter checking
subsequent commits will introduce.

To make sure (and in case we ever decide to reallow
cross-domain redirects) also use the final location
for containment and reachability checks.
2024-03-25 14:05:05 -01:00
f07eb4cb55 Sanity check fetched user data
In order to properly process incoming notes we need
to be able to map the key id back to an actor.
Also, check collections actually belong to the same server.

Key ids of Hubzilla and Bridgy samples were updated to what
modern versions of those output. If anything still uses the
old format, we would not be able to verify their posts anyway.
2024-03-25 14:05:05 -01:00
59a142e0b0 Never fetch resource from ourselves
If it’s not already in the database,
it must be counterfeit (or just not exists at all)

Changed test URLs were only ever used from "local: false" users anyway.
2024-03-25 14:05:05 -01:00
fee57eb376 Move actor check into fetch_and_contain_remote_object_from_id
This brings it in line with its name and closes an,
in practice harmless, verification hole.

This was/is the only user of contain_origin making it
safe to change the behaviour on actor-less objects.

Until now refetched objects did not ensure the new actor matches the
domain of the object. We refetch polls occasionally to retrieve
up-to-date vote counts. A malicious AP server could have switched out
the poll after initial posting with a completely different post
attribute to an actor from another server.
While we indeed fell for this spoof before the commit,
it fortunately seems to have had no ill effect in practice,
since the asociated Create activity is not changed. When exposing the
actor via our REST API, we read this info from the activity not the
object.

This at first thought still keeps one avenue for exploit open though:
the updated actor can be from our own domain and a third server be
instructed to fetch the object from us. However this is foiled by an
id mismatch. By necessity of being fetchable and our longstanding
same-domain check, the id must still be from the attacker’s server.
Even the most barebone authenticity check is able to sus this out.
2024-03-25 14:05:05 -01:00
c4cf4d7f0b Reject cross-domain redirects when fetching AP objects
Such redirects on AP queries seem most likely to be a spoofing attempt.
If the object is legit, the id should match the final domain anyway and
users can directly use the canonical URL.

The lack of such a check (and use of the initially queried domain’s
authority instead of the final domain) was enabling the current exploit
to even affect instances which already migrated away from a same-domain
upload/proxy setup in the past, but retained a redirect to not break old
attachments.

(In theory this redirect could, with some effort, have been limited to
 only old files, but common guides employed a catch-all redirect, which
 allows even future uploads to be reachable via an initial query to the
 main domain)

Same-domain redirects are valid and also used by ourselves,
e.g. for redirecting /notice/XXX to /objects/YYY.
2024-03-25 14:05:05 -01:00
2bcf633dc2 Document Pleroma.Object.Fetcher 2024-03-25 14:05:05 -01:00
c806adbfdb Refactor Fetcher.get_object for readability
Apart from slightly different error reasons wrt content-type,
this does not change functionality in any way.
2024-03-18 22:40:43 -01:00
ddd79ff22d Proactively harden emoji pack against path traversal
No new path traversal attacks are known. But given the many entrypoints
and code flow complexity inside pack.ex, it unfortunately seems
possible a future refactor or addition might reintroduce one.
Furthermore, some old packs might still contain traversing path entries
which could trigger undesireable actions on rename or delete.

To ensure this can never happen, assert safety during path construction.

Path.safe_relative was introduced in Elixir 1.14, but
fortunately, we already require at least 1.14 anyway.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
d6d838cbe8 StealEmoji: check remote size before downloading
To save on bandwith and avoid OOMs with large files.
Ofc, this relies on the remote server
 (a) sending a content-length header and
 (b) being honest about the size.

Common fedi servers seem to provide the header and (b) at least raises
the required privilege of an malicious actor to a server infrastructure
admin of an explicitly allowed host.

A more complete defense which still works when faced with
a malicious server requires changes in upstream Finch;
see https://github.com/sneako/finch/issues/224
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
a4fa2ec9af StealEmoji: make final paths infeasible to predict
Certain attacks rely on predictable paths for their payloads.
If we weren’t so overly lax in our (id, URL) check, the current
counterfeit activity exploit would be one of those.
It seems plausible for future attacks to hinge on
or being made easier by predictable paths too.

In general, letting remote actors place arbitrary data at
a path within our domain of their choosing (sans prefix)
just doesn’t seem like a good idea.

Using fully random filenames would have worked as well, but this
is less friendly for admins checking emoji dirs.
The generated suffix should still be more than enough;
an attacker needs on average 140 trillion attempts to
correctly guess the final path.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
d1c4d07404 Convert StealEmoji to pack.json
This will decouple filenames from shortcodes and
allow more image formats to work instead of only
those included in the auto-load glob. (Albeit we
still saved other formats to disk, wasting space)

Furthermore, this will allow us to make
final URL paths infeasible to predict.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
fa98b44acf Fill out path for newly created packs
Before this was only filled on loading the pack again,
preventing the created pack from being used directly.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
5b126567bb StealEmoji: drop superfluous basename
Since 3 commits ago we restrict shortcodes to a subset of
the POSIX Portable Filename Character Set, therefore
this can never have a directory component.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
a8c6c780b4 StealEmoji: use Content-Type and reject non-images
E.g. *key’s emoji URLs typically don’t have file extensions, but
until now we just slapped ".png" at its end hoping for the best.

Furthermore, this gives us a chance to actually reject non-images,
which before was not feasible exatly due to those extension-less URLs
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
111cdb0d86 Split steal_emoji function for better readability 2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
af041db6dc Limit emoji stealer to alphanum, dash, or underscore characters
As suggested in b387f4a1c1, only steal
emoji with alphanumerc, dash, or underscore characters.

Also consolidate all validation logic into a single function.

===

Taken from akkoma#703 with cosmetic tweaks

This matches our existing validation logic from Pleroma.Emoji,
and apart from excluding the dot also POSIX’s Portable Filename
Character Set making it always safe for use in filenames.

Mastodon is even stricter also disallowing U+002D HYPEN-MINUS
and requiring at least two characters.

Given both we and Mastodon reject shortcodes excluded
by this anyway, this doesn’t seem like a loss.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
fc36b04016 Drop media proxy same-domain default for base_url
Even more than with user uploads, a same-domain proxy setup bears
significant security risks due to serving untrusted content under
the main domain space.

A risky setup like that should never be the default.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
11ae8344eb Sanitise Content-Type of media proxy URLs
Just as with uploads and emoji before, this can otherwise be used
to place counterfeit AP objects or other malicious payloads.
In this case, even if we never assign a priviliged type to content,
the remote server can and until now we just mimcked whatever it told us.

Preview URLs already handle only specific, safe content types
and redirect to the external host for all else; thus no additional
sanitisiation is needed for them.

Non-previews are all delegated to the modified ReverseProxy module.
It already has consolidated logic for building response headers
making it easy to slip in sanitisation.

Although proxy urls are prefixed by a MAC built from a server secret,
attackers can still achieve a perfect id match when they are able to
change the contents of the pointed to URL. After sending an posts
containing an attachment at a controlled destination, the proxy URL can
be read back and inserted into the payload. After injection of
counterfeits in the target server the content can again be changed
to something innocuous lessening chance of detection.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
e88d0a2853 Fix Content-Type of our schema
Strict servers fail to process anything from us otherwise.

Fixes: akkoma#716
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
ba558c0c24 Limit instance emoji to image types
Else malicious emoji packs or our EmojiStealer MRF can
put payloads into the same domain as the instance itself.
Sanitising the content type should prevent proper clients
from acting on any potential payload.

Note, this does not affect the default emoji shipped with Akkoma
as they are handled by another plug. However, those are fully trusted
and thus not in needed of sanitisation.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
0ec62acb9d Always insert Dedupe upload filter
This actually was already intended before to eradict all future
path-traversal-style exploits and to fix issues with some
characters like akkoma#610 in 0b2ec0ccee. However, Dedupe and
AnonymizeFilename got mixed up. The latter only anonymises the name
in Content-Disposition headers GET parameters (with link_name),
_not_ the upload path.

Even without Dedupe, the upload path is prefixed by an UUID,
so it _should_ already be hard to guess for attackers. But now
we actually can be sure no path shenanigangs occur, uploads
reliably work and save some disk space.

While this makes the final path predictable, this prediction is
not exploitable. Insertion of a back-reference to the upload
itself requires pulling off a successfull preimage attack against
SHA-256, which is deemed infeasible for the foreseeable futures.

Dedupe was already included in the default list in config.exs
since 28cfb2c37a, but this will get overridde by whatever the
config generated by the "pleroma.instance gen" task chose.

Upload+delete tests running in parallel using Dedupe might be flaky, but
this was already true before and needs its own commit to fix eventually.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
fef773ca35 Drop media base_url default and recommend different domain
Same-domain setups enabled now at least two exploits,
so they ought to be discouraged and definitely not be the default.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
bdefbb8fd9 plug/upload_media: query config only once on init 2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
f7c9793542 Sanitise Content-Type of uploads
The lack thereof enables spoofing ActivityPub objects.

A malicious user could upload fake activities as attachments
and (if having access to remote search) trick local and remote
fedi instances into fetching and processing it as a valid object.

If uploads are hosted on the same domain as the instance itself,
it is possible for anyone with upload access to impersonate(!)
other users of the same instance.
If uploads are exclusively hosted on a different domain, even the most
basic check of domain of the object id and fetch url matching should
prevent impersonation. However, it may still be possible to trick
servers into accepting bogus users on the upload (sub)domain and bogus
notes attributed to such users.
Instances which later migrated to a different domain and have a
permissive redirect rule in place can still be vulnerable.
If — like Akkoma — the fetching server is overly permissive with
redirects, impersonation still works.

This was possible because Plug.Static also uses our custom
MIME type mappings used for actually authentic AP objects.

Provided external storage providers don’t somehow return ActivityStream
Content-Types on their own, instances using those are also safe against
their users being spoofed via uploads.

Akkoma instances using the OnlyMedia upload filter
cannot be exploited as a vector in this way — IF the
fetching server validates the Content-Type of
fetched objects (Akkoma itself does this already).

However, restricting uploads to only multimedia files may be a bit too
heavy-handed. Instead this commit will restrict the returned
Content-Type headers for user uploaded files to a safe subset, falling
back to generic 'application/octet-stream' for anything else.
This will also protect against non-AP payloads as e.g. used in
past frontend code injection attacks.

It’s a slight regression in user comfort, if say PDFs are uploaded,
but this trade-off seems fairly acceptable.

(Note, just excluding our own custom types would offer no protection
 against non-AP payloads and bear a (perhaps small) risk of a silent
 regression should MIME ever decide to add a canonical extension for
 ActivityPub objects)

Now, one might expect there to be other defence mechanisms
besides Content-Type preventing counterfeits from being accepted,
like e.g. validation of the queried URL and AP ID matching.
Inserting a self-reference into our uploads is hard, but unfortunately
*oma does not verify the id in such a way and happily accepts _anything_
from the same domain (without even considering redirects).
E.g. Sharkey (and possibly other *keys) seem to attempt to guard
against this by immediately refetching the object from its ID, but
this is easily circumvented by just uploading two payloads with the
ID of one linking to the other.

Unfortunately *oma is thus _both_ a vector for spoofing and
vulnerable to those spoof payloads, resulting in an easy way
to impersonate our users.

Similar flaws exists for emoji and media proxy.

Subsequent commits will fix this by rigorously sanitising
content types in more areas, hardening our checks, improving
the default config and discouraging insecure config options.
2024-03-18 22:33:10 -01:00
7ef93c0b6d Add set_content_type to Plug.StaticNoCT 2024-03-04 17:50:20 +01:00
dbb6091d01 Import copy of Plug.Static from Plug 1.15.3
The following commit will apply the needed patch
2024-03-04 17:50:20 +01:00
7d61fb0906 Merge pull request 'Fix static-fe Twitter metadata / URL previews' (#700) from Oneric/akkoma:staticfe-metadata into develop
Reviewed-on: AkkomaGang/akkoma#700
2024-02-24 13:42:55 +00:00
3111181d3c mix format 2024-02-20 15:09:04 +00:00
b387f4a1c1 Don't steal emoji who's shortcodes have dots or colons in their name
Mastodon at the very least seems to prevent the creation of emoji with
dots in their name (and refuses to accept them in federation). It feels
like being cautious in what we accept is reasonable here.

Colons are the emoji separator and so obviously should be blocked.

Perhaps instead of filtering out things like this we should just
do a regex match on `[a-zA-Z0-9_-]`? But that's plausibly a decision
for another day

    Perhaps we should also have a centralised "is this a valid emoji shortcode?"
    function
2024-02-20 11:33:55 +01:00
Haelwenn (lanodan) Monnier
7d94476dd6 StealEmojiPolicy: Sanitize shortcodes
Closes: https://git.pleroma.social/pleroma/pleroma/-/issues/3245
2024-02-20 11:19:00 +01:00
37e2a35b86 Fix Twitter metadata
This partly reverts 1d884fd914
while fixing both the issue it addressed and the issue it caused.

The above commit successfully fixed OpenGraph metadata tags
which until then always showed the user bio instead of post content
by handing the activities AP ID as url to the Metadata builder
_instead_ of passing the internal ID as activity_id.
However, in doing so the commit instead inflicted this very problem
onto Twitter metadata tags which ironically are used by akkoma-fe.

This is because while the OpenGraph builder wants an URL as url,
the Twitter builder needs the internal ID to build the URL to the
embedded player for videos and has no URL property.

Thanks to twpol for tracking down this root cause in #644.

Now, once identified the problem is simple, but this simplicity
invites multiple possible solutions to bikeshed about.

 1. Just pass both properties to the builder and let them pick

 2. Drop the url parameter from the OpenGraph builder and instead
     a) build static-fe URL of the post from the ID (like Twitter)
     b) use the passed-in object’s AP ID as an URL

Approach 2a has the disadvantage of hardcoding the expected URL outside
the router, which will be problematic should it ever change.
Approach 2b is conceptually similar to how the builder works atm.
However, the og:url is supposed to be a _permanent_ ID, by changing it
we might, afaiui, technically violate OpenGraph specs(?). (Though its
real-world consequence may very well be near non-existent.)

This leaves just approach 1, which this commit implements.
Albeit it too is not without nits to pick, as it leaves the metadata
builders with an inconsistent interface.

Additionally, this will resolve the subotpimal Discord previews for
content-less image posts reported in #664.
Discord already prefers OpenGraph metadata, so it’s mostly unaffected.
However, it appears when encountering an explicitly empty OpenGraph
description and a non-empty Twitter description, it replaces just the
empty field with its Twitter counterpart, resulting in the user’s bio
slipping into the preview.
Secondly, regardless of any OpenGraph tags, Discord uses twitter:card to
decide how prominently images should be, but due to the bug the card
type was stuck as "summary", forcing images to always remain small.

Root cause identified by: twpol

Fixes: AkkomaGang/akkoma#644
Fixes: AkkomaGang/akkoma#664
2024-02-19 21:09:43 +00:00
3e24210e9f Merge pull request 'Prune old Update activities' (#683) from Oneric/akkoma:db-prune-old-updates into develop
Reviewed-on: AkkomaGang/akkoma#683
2024-02-19 13:59:33 +00:00
551ae69541 Merge pull request 'Fix and provide sane defaults for SMTP' (#686) from Oneric/akkoma:smtp-defaults into develop
Reviewed-on: AkkomaGang/akkoma#686
2024-02-19 13:39:15 +00:00
1a7839eaf2 Prune old Update activities
Once processed they serve no purpose anymore afaict.
Therefor, lets prune them like other transient activities
to not unnecessarily bloat the table.
2024-02-17 16:57:40 +01:00
755c75d8a4 Merge pull request 'Clean up warnings (+fallback metrics)' (#685) from Oneric/akkoma:metrics into develop
Reviewed-on: AkkomaGang/akkoma#685
2024-02-17 11:41:10 +00:00
289f93f5a2 Merge pull request 'Return last_status_at as date, not datetime' (#681) from katafrakt/akkoma:fix-last-status-at into develop
Reviewed-on: AkkomaGang/akkoma#681
2024-02-17 11:37:19 +00:00
e99e2407f3 Add background_removal to SimplePolicy MRF 2024-02-16 16:36:45 +01:00
7622aa27ca Federate user profile background
Currently our own frontend doesn’t show backgrounds of other users, this
property is already publicly readable via REST API and likely was always
intended to be shown and federated.

Recently Sharkey added support for profile backgrounds and
immediately made them federate and be displayed to others.
We use the same AP field as Sharkey here which should make
it interoperable both ways out-of-the-box.

Ref.: 4e64397635
2024-02-16 16:35:51 +01:00
0ed815b8a1 Merge branch 'followback' into develop 2024-02-16 13:27:40 +00:00
c5dcd07e08 Merge pull request 'Fix OpenAPI spec for preferred_frontend endpoint' (#680) from katafrakt/akkoma:fix-openapi-spec-for-preferred-frontend into develop
Reviewed-on: AkkomaGang/akkoma#680
2024-02-16 12:21:00 +00:00
874ee73a87 Merge pull request 'Document Akkoma API' (#678) from Oneric/akkoma:doc-akkomapi into develop
Reviewed-on: AkkomaGang/akkoma#678
2024-02-16 12:20:11 +00:00
cda597a05c doc: fix Akkoma identification name
Akkoma stopped pretending to be Pleroma here when the mix project name
was changed in c07fcdbf2b.
2024-02-15 16:25:59 +01:00
Haelwenn (lanodan) Monnier
cb7eaccecb Config: Check the permissions of the linked file instead of the symlink↵ 2024-02-14 18:30:27 +01:00
376f6b15ca Add ability to auto-approve followbacks
Resolves: AkkomaGang/akkoma#148
2024-02-13 15:42:37 +01:00