Since we now remember the final location redirects lead to
and use it for all further checks since
3e134b07fa, these redirects
can no longer be exploited to serve counterfeit objects.
This fixes:
- display URLs from independent webapp clients
redirecting to the canonical domain
- Peertube display URLs for remote content
(acting like the above)
As hinted at in the commit message when strict checking
was added in 8684964c5d,
refetching is more robust than display URL comparison
but in exchange is harder to implement correctly.
A similar refetch approach is also employed by
e.g. Mastodon, IceShrimp and FireFish.
To make sure no checks can be bypassed by forcing
a refetch, id checking is placed at the very end.
This will fix:
- Peertube display URL arrays our transmogrifier fails to normalise
- non-canonical display URLs from alternative frontends
(theoretical; we didnt’t get any actual reports about this)
It will also be helpful in the planned key handling overhaul.
The modified user collision test was introduced in
https://git.pleroma.social/pleroma/pleroma/-/merge_requests/461
and unfortunately the issues this fixes aren’t public.
Afaict it was just meant to guard against someone serving
faked data belonging to an unrelated domain. Since we now
refetch and the id actually is mocked, lookup now succeeds
but will use the real data from the authorative server
making it unproblematic. Instead modify the fake data further
and make sure we don’t end up using the spoofed version.
Usually an id should point to another AP object
and the image file isn’t an AP object. We currently
do not provide standalone AP objects for emoji and
don't keep track of remote emoji at all.
Thus just federate them as anonymous objects,
i.e. objects only existing within a parent context
and using an explicit null id.
IceShrimp.NET previously adopted anonymous objects
for remote emoji without any apparent issues. See:
333611f65e
Fixes: #694
Ever since 364b6969eb
this setting wasn't used by the backend and a noop.
The stated usecase is better served by setting the base_url
to a local subdomain and using proxying in nginx/Caddy/...
This lets us:
- avoid issues with broken hash indices for PostgreSQL <10
- drop runtime checks and legacy codepaths for <11 in db search
- always enable custom query plans for performance optimisation
PostgreSQL 11 is already EOL since 2023-11-09, so
in theory everyone should already have moved on to 12 anyway.
Logger output being visible depends on user configuration, but most of
the prints in mix tasks should always be shown. When running inside a
mix shell, it’s probably preferable to send output directly to it rather
than using raw IO.puts and we already have shell_* functions for this,
let’s use them everywhere.
Meilisearch is already configured to return results sorted by a
particular ranking configured in the meilisearch CLI task.
Resorting the returned top results by date partially negates this and
runs counter to what someone with tweaked settings expects.
Issue and fix identified by AdamK2003 in
#579
But instead of using a O(n^2) resorting, this commit directly
retrieves results in the correct order from the database.
Closes: #579
Trying to display non-media as media crashed the renderer,
but when posting a status with a valid, non-media object id
the post was still created, but then crashed e.g. timeline rendering.
It also crashed C2S inbox reads, so this could not be used to leak
private posts.
In Mastodon media can only be used by owners and only be associated with
a single post. We currently allow media to be associated with several
posts and until now did not limit their usage in posts to media owners.
However, media update and GET lookup was already limited to owners.
(In accordance with allowing media reuse, we also still allow GET
lookups of media already used in a post unlike Mastodon)
Allowing reuse isn’t problematic per se, but allowing use by non-owners
can be problematic if media ids of private-scoped posts can be guessed
since creating a new post with this media id will reveal the uploaded
file content and alt text.
Given media ids are currently just part of a sequentieal series shared
with some other objects, guessing media ids is with some persistence
indeed feasible.
E.g. sampline some public media ids from a real-world
instance with 112 total and 61 monthly-active users:
17.465.096 at t0
17.472.673 at t1 = t0 + 4h
17.473.248 at t2 = t1 + 20min
This gives about 30 new ids per minute of which most won't be
local media but remote and local posts, poll answers etc.
Assuming the default ratelimit of 15 post actions per 10s, scraping all
media for the 4h interval takes about 84 minutes and scraping the 20min
range mere 6.3 minutes. (Until the preceding commit, post updates were
not rate limited at all, allowing even faster scraping.)
If an attacker can infer (e.g. via reply to a follower-only post not
accessbile to the attacker) some sensitive information was uploaded
during a specific time interval and has some pointers regarding the
nature of the information, identifying the specific upload out of all
scraped media for this timerange is not impossible.
Thus restrict media usage to owners.
Checking ownership just in ActivitDraft would already be sufficient,
since when a scheduled status actually gets posted it goes through
ActivityDraft again, but would erroneously return a success status
when scheduling an illegal post.
Independently discovered and fixed by mint in Pleroma
1afde067b1
