Trying to display non-media as media crashed the renderer,
but when posting a status with a valid, non-media object id
the post was still created, but then crashed e.g. timeline rendering.
It also crashed C2S inbox reads, so this could not be used to leak
private posts.
Afaict this was never used, but keeping this (in theory) possible
hinders detecting which objects are actually media uploads and
which proper ActivityPub objects.
It was originally added as part of upload support itself in
02d3dc6869 without being used
and `git log -S:activity_type` and `git log -Sactivity_type:`
don't find any other commits using this.
In Mastodon media can only be used by owners and only be associated with
a single post. We currently allow media to be associated with several
posts and until now did not limit their usage in posts to media owners.
However, media update and GET lookup was already limited to owners.
(In accordance with allowing media reuse, we also still allow GET
lookups of media already used in a post unlike Mastodon)
Allowing reuse isn’t problematic per se, but allowing use by non-owners
can be problematic if media ids of private-scoped posts can be guessed
since creating a new post with this media id will reveal the uploaded
file content and alt text.
Given media ids are currently just part of a sequentieal series shared
with some other objects, guessing media ids is with some persistence
indeed feasible.
E.g. sampline some public media ids from a real-world
instance with 112 total and 61 monthly-active users:
17.465.096 at t0
17.472.673 at t1 = t0 + 4h
17.473.248 at t2 = t1 + 20min
This gives about 30 new ids per minute of which most won't be
local media but remote and local posts, poll answers etc.
Assuming the default ratelimit of 15 post actions per 10s, scraping all
media for the 4h interval takes about 84 minutes and scraping the 20min
range mere 6.3 minutes. (Until the preceding commit, post updates were
not rate limited at all, allowing even faster scraping.)
If an attacker can infer (e.g. via reply to a follower-only post not
accessbile to the attacker) some sensitive information was uploaded
during a specific time interval and has some pointers regarding the
nature of the information, identifying the specific upload out of all
scraped media for this timerange is not impossible.
Thus restrict media usage to owners.
Checking ownership just in ActivitDraft would already be sufficient,
since when a scheduled status actually gets posted it goes through
ActivityDraft again, but would erroneously return a success status
when scheduling an illegal post.
Independently discovered and fixed by mint in Pleroma
1afde067b1
In MastoAPI media descriptions are updated via the
media update API not upon post creation or post update.
This functionality was originally added about 6 years ago in
ba93396649 which was part of
https://git.pleroma.social/pleroma/pleroma/-/merge_requests/626 and
https://git.pleroma.social/pleroma/pleroma-fe/-/merge_requests/450.
They introduced image descriptions to the front- and backend,
but predate adoption of Mastodon API.
For a while adding an `descriptions` array on post creation might have
continued to work as an undocumented Pleroma extension to Masto API, but
at latest when OpenAPI specs were added for those endpoints four years
ago in 7803a85d2c, these codepaths ceased
to be used. The API specs don’t list a `descriptions` parameter and
any unknown parameters are stripped out.
The attachments_from_ids function is only called from
ScheduledActivity and ActivityDraft.create with the latter
only being called by CommonAPI.{post,update} whihc in turn
are only called from ScheduledActivity again, MastoAPI controller
and without any attachment or description parameter WelcomeMessage.
Therefore no codepath can contain a descriptions parameter.
Documentation was already clear on this only stripping GPS tags.
But there are more potentially sensitive metadata tags (e.g. author
and possibly description) and the name alone suggests a broader effect.
Thus change the filter to strip all metadata except for colourspace info
and orientation (technically it strips everything and then readds
selected tags).
Explicitly stripping CommonIFD0 is needed since -all does not modify
IFD0 due to TIFF storing some actual image data there. CommonIFD0 then
strips a bunch of commonly used actual metadata tags from IFD0, to my
understanding leaving TIFF image data and custom metadata tags intact.
As of exiftool 12.57 both formats are supported, but EXIF data is
optional for JXL and if exiftool doesn’t find a preexisting metadata
chunk it will create one and treat it as a minor error resulting in
a non-zero exit code.
Setting -ignoreMinorErrors avoids failing on such uploads.
Due to JSON-LD compaction the full address of public scope
may also occur in shorter forms and the spec requires us to treat them
all equivalently. To save us the pain of repeatedly checking for all
variants internally, normalise inbound data to just one form.
See note at: https://www.w3.org/TR/activitypub/#public-addressing
This needs to happen very early, even before the other addressing fixes
else an earlier validator will reject the object. This in turn required
to move the list-tpye normalisation earlier as well, but since I was
unsure about putting empty lists into the data when no such field
existed before, I excluded this case and thus the later fixing had to be
kept as well.
Fixes: #670
literally nothing uses C2S AP, and it's another route into core
systems which requires analysis and maintenance. A second API
is just extra surface for potentially bad things so let's take
it out back and obliterate it
by default just prevent job floods with a 1-seconds
uniqueness check, but override in RemoteFetcherWorker
for 5 minute uniqueness check over all states
:infinity is an option we can go for maybe at some point,
but that would prevent any refetches so maybe not idk.
